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I
INTRODUCTION
Governance is a low profile activity within the judiciary. Judges are
reluctant to exercise authority over each other outside the realm of appeals;
they value decentralization, local autonomy, and ample room for individual
initiative in the organization of their work.' Judicial independence means not
just freedom from control by other branches of government, but freedom
from control by other judges. The ideal of autonomous judges, with roots
deep in American legal culture, powerfully influences contemporary debates
about efficiency and accountability within the judiciary.
The preference for administrative independence is particularly strong in
the federal court system. The institutions that Congress has established to
facilitate communication and policymaking within the federal courts-chief
judgeships, circuit councils, circuit conferences, and the Judicial Conference
of the United States-are active in communicating the needs of the judiciary
to others, but these institutions are reluctant to plan, coordinate activities,
and set and enforce administrative policy. Congressional prodding was
required, for example, to force the circuits to democratize their governing
councils and to implement systematic review of complaints over judicial
misconduct and disability.2
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the federal system of governance
and administration and to speculate about its likely future. The federal
system relies upon circuit governments, each virtually independent of the
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others, but under some direction from the center. The system is currently
under attack from both inside and outside the judicial branch. Judicial officers
at the bottom of the federal hierarchy express resentment at being excluded
from circuit deliberations. Outside the judiciary, Congress and other
institutions that work with the courts are concerned that the circuits do not
take sufficient responsibility for holding down costs, for controlling
misconduct in the ranks, and for reducing delay.
In an effort to elucidate this debate, this article focuses on -the Ninth
Circuit, which has gone furthest in implementing democratic, participatory,
active governance. The complexity of the subject of judicial governance
necessitates such a strategy of selective investigation. This approach is also
defensible in its own right because the inherent strengths and limitations of
circuit governance are most evident in the areas where it has been most
carefully nurtured.
The Ninth Circuit is the largest circuit in the federal system in terms of'
geographical size, population, caseload, and number ofjudges. The circuit is
made up of nine states, and its borders range from the Arctic Circle to Mexico
and from the Rockies to the Pacific Trust Territories. One-sixth of all federal
judicial officers work in the Ninth Circuit. The circuit has a staff of over 3000
and an annual budget of $200 million. Civil filings and terminations in the
circuit's fifteen district courts approximate 38,000 annually; bankruptcy court
filings are nearly 150,000 annually; the court of appeals handles between 5000
and 6000 cases each year. Talk of splitting the circuit, not surprisingly, has
been common for at least twenty years."
The survival of the Ninth Circuit has depended on a combination of
inertia, a favorable political climate, and a degree of circuit-minded leadership
and organization that is unique in the federal system. Judge James R.
Browning, Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit from 1976 to 1988, was an
innovator in case management and the principal architect of the Ninth Circuit
experiment in self-governance. Attention to matters of governance was
necessary, Browning reasoned, to ensure that new ideas would be
implemented successfully, to maintain esprit de corps, and to help protect the
circuit from division. Aided by an unusually long term of office and a talented
staff, Browning created a multi-layered, broadly based system of governance
designed to promote consensus and to permit decisive action.
How authoritative has government actually proven to be in the Ninth
Circuit? How authoritative should government be when many citizens of the
polity are article III judges? How much autonomy, for example, is
appropriate for district courts (or individuals within these courts) in tailoring
procedures to local needs and personal preference? Who should define the
relationship between article III and non-article III judicial officers? More
3. Similar talk in the Filth Circuit resulted in a split. The politics of' dismemberment and the
capacity of circuit institutions to respond to cxternal initiatives of this sort arc exploired in D. BARROW
& I'. VW AIKER, A COUR I DIVIDED: THliE FiRn U CIR COURT OFu(oAI APPEL AND -T1IE POIITICS OF
JtD)(:Al. REFORM (1988).
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generally, what does the Ninth Circuit experience teach about the capacity of'
circuit government to achieve legitimacy within the circuit and accountability
beyond the circuit?
This article is divided into three parts. The first explores the concept of
circuit self-government initiated by Congress in 1939 and implemented by the
federal judiciary in the decades that followed. The second concerns the effort
to make Ninth Circuit governing institutions more democratic and forward-
looking. The theme of the third part is evaluation; interviews with members
of the Ninth Circuit community, observation of governing institutions at work,
and analysis of internal court documents suggest the capacities of the current
system of circuit government.-
It should be noted at the outset that the language of governance invoked
here suggests a set of concerns derived fiom experience in more familiar
political settings. The terminology encourages the reader to think in terms of
policynaking by duly selected agents, mechanisms for enforcing the policy
choices, a community linked by common concerns, and citizenship within that
community. Accountability, access, and participation are values relevant to
assessing governing institutions, and the Ninth Circuit has taken these values
into account in designing its governing institutions.
The circuit has not, however, embraced those aspects of democratic
governance associated with mobilizing citizen interest and defining political
issues: campaigning, partisanship, and the development of political platforms.
These activities, so familiar in less constrained political settings, seem
anomalous in a judicial polity. The Ninth Circuit's version of organizational
democracy, however robust against the backdrop of the judiciary, inevitably
seems bloodless against the backdrop of political life in the larger community.
The very imagery that justifies the circuit's movement toward democracy thus
points to certain tensions in the concept when it is applied to a judicial setting.
II
INSTITUTIONAl. ACCOUNTABILITY: FINDING A ROLE FOR THE CIRCUIT
The current systen of governance within the federal courts took shape
with the adoption of the Administrative Office Act of 1939.-5 The impulse for
broad institutional reform came from Inany sources, including President
Franklin Roosevelt, who had an agenda for improving the administration of
the federal courts." The 1939 legislation provided the federal court system
4. For details of the interviews, see in/ia note 76. Many of thcse interviews were conducted
with the understanding that the speaker would ,remain ationymous. Consequently, not all statements
dquoted in this article are attributed to the speaker.
5. Ch. 501. 53 Stat. 1223 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1982)).
6. P. Fisi. I',, E POLITCS OF FFDERAI.JUI)ICIAI. ADMNISTRATION 112-16 (1973). Roosevlt's
plan for increasing the menlbership of the Supreme Court is better known, hot his ideas for
improving the dcourts extended to the rest of the federal court system as well. lIe recommended the
establishment of a proctor who would help [Ihe SurCpreme Coturt play an active role in administering
tile system. Judges would be rmade available for service wherever needed, for example. Id. at 116.
I'his plan was on popular at everv level in thc fedetraljudiciary, including the U.S. Supreme Court. Id.
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with its own agency, the Administrative Office of United States Courts, which
assumed administrative functions previously performed by the Department of
Justice. The Administrative Office was to take its direction from the Judicial
Conference of the United States, a body at that time headed by the Chief
Justice of the United States and made up of the senior (now chief) judge from
each circuit.
The framers of the 1939 law envisioned a significant regional dimension in
the overall scheme of government. Problems arising in the districts would be
resolved at the circuit level, and grassroots ideas for reform would be debated
in the circuits first. 7 The senior judge of each circuit would communicate the
region's concerns and ideas to institutions at the national level and assist the
circuit in implementing national policy. Giving the circuits a significant role
in governance was a strategy for satisfying demands for a more accountable
system while avoiding centralized control based in the U.S. Supreme Court or
in a Washington bureaucracy.
The legislation set up two forums for communicating, clarifying, and
resolving administrative problems at the circuit level: an annual conference of
bench and bar, and a council composed of members of the court of appeals
and headed by the seniorjudge of that court. Some of the circuits had already
instituted similiar conferences on an informal and irregular basis." In an
effort to ensure that these gatherings were more than purely social events, the
1939 law specified that the conferences be devoted to "considering tile state
of the business of the courts and advising ways and means of improving the
administration ofjustice within the circuit. '"'
Actual policymaking was to occur in the circuit councils. A number of
specific duties were mandated, as well as the general purpose of ensuring that
"the work of the district courts shall be effectively and expeditiously
transacted.""' District judges were required to "promptly carry out the
direction of the council as to the administration of the business of their
respective courts."
With the encouragement of the Judicial Conference, Congress built upon
this foundation in subsequent legislation, adding tasks for the councils
beyond those outlined in the 1939 law. -'he Federal Magistrates Act of 1968,
at 119. Tlhe Justices of the Supreme Court, partic ulariy Chief Justice Hughes, did not want the job of
adininistrator-in-chief. Id. at 137-38.
7. Id. at 145-65.
8. Id.
9. Administratixe Oflice Act, ch. 501, § 307, 53 Stit. 1223, 1225 (1939) (Currcut veIsion at 28
U.S.C. § 333 (1982)).
10. Administrative Office Act, ch. 501, § 306, 53 Stat. 1223, 1224 (1939) (current version at 28
U.S.C.A. § 332(d)(1) (\Vest Supp. 1989)). The 1948 revisiou of'thCJudiCial Code strCugthCe Cd this
language to read: "Lich judicial council siall make all neccssar orders I lo the effI'ctive and
expeditious administration ofihe business of the courts within its circuit.- Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
646, § 332, 62 Stat. 902, 902 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 332(d)(1) (Vest Supp. 1989)).
I 1. Act of June 25, 1948. ch. 646. § 332, 62 Stat. 902, 902. The seclion was amended by Aci of
Oct. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, § 2, 94 Stat. 2035. 2035 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(2)
(1982)), to read: "All judicial oflicers and employees of the circuit shall promptly carry iuo eflec all
orders of the judicial council.
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for example, requires the circuit councils to recommend when full- and part-
time magistrates are needed.' 2 The Judicial Conference relies on these
evaluations in its own recommendations to Congress."3 The clear intent, in
the words of the leading historian of these developments, was to make the
councils "the cornerstone of the federal judiciary's administrative
institution." ' 14
A. Ambiguities in Regional Authority
The activities of the councils were the subject of congressional
reconsideration in 1978. In his testimony, JudgeJ. Clifford Wallace provided
a useful summary of council responsibilities as of that time:
IThe councils first] approve plans of the district courts for jury selection, counsel
appointed under the Criminal Justice Act, and speedy trial compliance; ... [second.
they makel certain housekeeping approvals. such as the place to keep records, court
quarters, designation of residence of a district judge, pretermission of a regular
session of court, and staffs of'senior judges; [third, they] approve the selection of and
salaries of public defenders: [fourth, they] recommend numbers and salaries of
magistrates and bankruptcy judges; [fifth, they] issue a certification of )hysical or
mental disability of a judge: [sixth, they] make decisions when district judges cannot
agree on rules, magistrates to be selected, or recommendations on salary.)
This summary suggests considerable council authority to affect the
conditions of adjudication within the circuit, but no orientation toward
planning, mobilizing for change, or mandating improvements in the way
judges administer their courts. It is unclear how far the drafters of the 1939
legislation expected the councils to go in these directions. The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, promulgated in 1938, were also silent on just how the new
national policy of uniform rules was to coexist with the tradition of localism
and personal idiosyncracy in federal court administration.)" The Federal
Rules allow (but do not require) rulemaking at the district level, and permit
12. Federal Magistrates Act, lub. . No. 90-578. 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (codified in scattered
sections of 18 & 28 U.S.C. (1982)).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See also the plrovisions of the Crinal JustiCe
Act of 1964 referring to district court procedures for providing rcprcsentation to indigent
defendants, Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982 &
Suc p . \ 1987)). and the section oftheJurs Selection ard Service Act of 1968 which provides for the
selection of grand ancd petit jurors bs the district courts, Pub. L. No. 90-274, § 1863(a), 82 Stat. 53,
54 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1863(a) (West Supp. 1989)). In each case the council
reviews the disIricI CLirts plans for conformity with slatutory requirements. [hese specific grants
nav be redundant in light of the broad grant o authority ovei distiicr court adminisIration provided
in 28 U.S.C. § 332. See P. Fisit, opra mote 6, at 397-99.
14. P. Fisr, supa note 6, att 165. Elsewhere. Fish states that "the framers of the 1939 Act
intended the councils as the administrative linchpin of the federal ludiciary." Id. at 387.
15. Judicial Disciplne and Tem n. Ileahngs on S. 295, S. 522. and S. 678 Befor the Subomm. on
fm/n vements in /odicial ( l'hiter- and the Sbcomm. oin the Constitutiin ] the Seate Comm. oi thefndiiac,
96th Cong., I st Sess. 37 (1979) (statement of Judge J. Cliflord Wallace). Council duties have grown
since then. See. e.g.. 1/)a p. 102. discussing the council's new oversight responsibilities with respect
io local rules.
16. The Federal Rules of Civil 'rocedure repircsented a Iruls radical break with tradition and
prior law. wich had prescribed thatl the fedceral courts should iodel thein local rules to coutforni to
court rtles in their own localities. See C. Seron, The limitations of Stinidudi-ingjulge's Practices 7-
13 (unpublished inantisCriplt).
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individual judges considerable latitude to experiment with procedures.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 exemplifies the approach; it offers a
catalogue of options for district judges who seek to streamline trials or
facilitate settlements. ' 7
Nevertheless, circuit governance must have disappointed some of its
earliest proponents. In the 1940's and 1950's, a number of circuits either did
not even convene the required conferences, or held only pro forma
gatherings. I8 The councils likewise failed to do more than the minimum
required by law. Conceived without power to subpoena witnesses, without
significant staff support, and without clear-cut sanctioning authority, the
councils appear to have been unprepared to move forcefully against errant
judges or to take on other difficult regulatory tasks.' t
Some of these deficiencies were remedied over the course of years, but
there were no dramatic changes in the character of council activity. The
councils gained the power to require the attendance of witnesses with the
adoption of the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability
Act of 1980.21 This Act was designed to encourage circuit councils to deal
more vigorously with the problem ofjudicial misconduct.2' By that time the
circuit councils had also acquired more staff support. In 1971 Congress
created the position of circuit executive and authorized the executive, subject
to council guidance, to arrange for and attend council meetings, to conduct
studies, and to prepare reports for the council.22
17. The tendency has been to interpret these sections expansively, and to find in the common
law additional rationales for leaving district judges to their own administrative devices. See, e.g..
Resnik, Failing Faith: .. djidicalor Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Ct. L. REV. 494, 527 (1986).
18. R. Wheeler, Federal Circuit Judicial Conferences: Changing Format and Changing Role 6
(Mar. 15, 1982) (unpublished manuscript on file at the Federal Judicial Center).
19. Fish suggests that the expectation of the fi-amers was thai judges would be motivated to
behave appropriately by virtue of their internalization of professional norms and dread of rejection
by their professional peers. P. Fisit, supra note 6, at 161-62. Steven Flanders and John Mcl)ermol
concluded that this approach worked "fairly well" after they interviewed judges and cot rt personnel
in every circuit as a pat of their 1978 study of the federal judicial councils. S. FLANDERS & J.
MCI)ERMOTr, OPERATION OF TIE FE I)ERAI. JUI)ICIAi. COUNCI.s 52 (1978). Flanders and Mcl)ermot
also conclded that the initial powers delegated to the coIncils were adequate. although a problenm
arose because the judges were occasionally unwilling to use them. Id. at 46-52.
20. Pil. L. No. 96-458, § 4. 94 Stat. 2035, 2040 (codified as aitetlded it 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1982
& Supp. V 1987)). The misconduct and disability procedures are codified at 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)
(1982 & Supp. V 1987). For an argument that these new provisions have actually done very little to
encourage more vigorotus enforcetieit, see Reiger, 7"l,,iedicial Counr'i leformi andJudinial ('onduct and
Disabilitv Act: 1i /iidgeudgefudge. 37 EMoR l.J. 45, 93 (1988).
21. For a detailed discussion of the Act's legislative histor, see Burbank, Procedural li lemaking
I 'ider theJudirial Coiiucil Re irm andlludicial Condutl aind Disabiliy .1(1 of 1980. 131 U. P,.. L. REV. 283,
291-308 (1982).
22. Circtuit Fxectitives Act, Pub. L No. 91-647, 84 Slat. 1907 (1971) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 332(e), (1) (1982)). 1The first decade of experience with circuit executivcs is discusseCd inJ. MACV.
I'iE FIRsT DECADE OF ttE CIRCtUT COURT Ext ctvnri\': AN EV.AtLUATON (1984).
In 1981 Congress established executive positions on an experimental basis in tlhe live largest
districts. L.os Angeles was the only district in the Ninth Circuit to qualify. Perhaps because the
relationship between the district executive and the cour clerk was never made clear. the concept ofa
districi execulive never gained a stre foothold. The Senate relised to approve funds for these
positions in the 1989 hudget, and the judicial Contlerence did tiot apl)eal the decision. The role of
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Confusion and continuing disagreement over the degree to which
appellate judges should oversee the administration of the district courts have
also fostered council passivity. Even before the adoption of the stronger 1980
legislation, many judges worried that the councils had too much power.
Writing in 1978, Stephen Flanders and John McDermott concluded:
The supervisory powers of judicial councils make many judges uncomfortable,
whether they serve on a district court or a court of appeals. Many judges feel that
section 332 lacks effective enforcement power, or that it is unconstitutional, or both.
Many circuit judges also feel that, whatever their powers under section 332 might be,
the unpleasant duties associated with counl responsibilities are "not really part of
the job" or are not truly part of the judicial sy'stem. -3
The question of council power to discipline judges remains controversial.
Congress has never spelled out how council oversight of circuit activities is
justified in constitutional terms, probably because the leadership within the
judicial branch has always been divided on this issue.2 4 Nor has the Judicial
Conference come to terms with its own authority to supervise and demand
action from the councils. 2 5
The make-up of the councils has also discouraged active governance. The
appellate judges who sit on the councils have little day-to-day contact with the
type of administrative problems that district judges experience, though some
can draw upon earlier experience as district judges. The organization of work
at each level is very different, appellate judges enjoying considerable
insulation from the management problems district judges confront as they
struggle to cope with attorneys, litigants, jurors, and the general public in
their daily work. The problem of differences in administrative experience is
exacerbated by the appellate process, which creates tensions between
reviewers and the reviewed.2 '  Friendships between some district and
appellate judges also complicate circuit governance. Reticence to second-
guess the district courts in the administrative realm has therefore seemed the
wisest course in the circuit councils. 2 7
Evidence of the administrative independence federal district judges enjoy
is everywhere. No two judges, it seems, do anything in precisely the same
way. Litigators ignore these local idiosyncracies at their peril. Federal
the district executives is evaluated in \V. EKi)Rt Ht -lItlE )IST tRICT COURT FXECUIIVE Pii.OT PRO(;RAM
(1984).
23. S. FI. NDEiRS &.J. NMcI)ERNO-TI', stpral note 19, at 46. see also i/. at 15, 26, 47-49.
24. Perhaps the best known example of dissension in the judicial ranks is Chandler v. Judicial
Cou ncil of the - enth Cirtcuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1970). -'he majorlity nee r ireached the consiltitional
issue., bil ii did appFove, generally, thee eXeiSC Of Council atithority. Black and )otglas, in a
vigor ous dissent, challenged that authority ./d at 137. Judge Frank J. Battisti recorded a similar
opinCion of the potential oa council overreaching ill Batlisli. A.In Independent Judicialy 01 a Evanescen
Dream. 25 CASE W. Rl-s. i.. Rv. 711, 745 (1975). For a desciription of Judge Battisti's ,ecent battles
with his o(lwt circttit council, see Baltisti Battlin Bench Brehren Nat 'I L.J., Apr. 3. 1989, at 12, col. 1.
25. For a disctission of the problem in the context o[ procedurces the circuits have developed to
dfealI with comi) lplaiints of judicial disability and misconduct. see Burbank, Poliir and Progress m
Imp/enl/ingew I he IderalJidicial Disripline .r/, 71 JUICATURE 3, 14-16 (1987).
26 . " he problem," as one district judge i c i a tked, "is thb.at they grade otir papers." seeg nge' ially
(rp & Wheeler. Sink oi Swim: Te Socializaiohn /a ledrial Dislri (Judge, 21 .. Pui. .. 359. 378 (1972).
27 p. tisitl, slia note 6. at 406.
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litigators in one California district, for example, recently compiled a manual
documenting differences among district judges in such matters as scheduling
procedures, motion practice, alternative dispute resolution programs, and
voir dire.2-' The local federal bar, which marketed the volume to finance its
activities, reports brisk sales. Lawyers, this California example suggests, have
learned to cope with administrative diversity within a supposedly national
system of court rules.
B. The Demands of Contemporary Conditions
Judicial governance at the district, circuit, and national levels has thus
never really challenged the federal tradition of administrative individualism.
The circuit councils and other institutions of governance have had some
success in dealing with sharp deviations from acceptable practice and in
communicating good ideas, but they are not inclined to mandate consistency
across administrative units. The Judicial Conference of the United States,
often working through the Administrative Office, has moved into the
administrative breach to a limited extent, but it too treads softly in dealing
with article III judges.
This approach to governance is solicitous of the independence ofjudges,
but offers the judiciary little protection against charges that it is inefficient and
unaccountable for its actions. These concerns take on greater weight in the
current environment. The federal caseload is steadily increasing in size and
complexity. The make-up of the federal courts' work force is also changing,
with managerial and article I personnel taking over some of the tasks formerly
performed by article III judges, who are in ever shorter supply relative to the
caseload.2' The federal courts, in short, must manage larger caseloads with
fewer resources in a more complex organizational environment.
These increasing demands upon courts have created unprecedented
pressures to rationalize and streamline the process of adjudication while
preserving individual rights. Coordination, accountability, cost savings, and
efficiency have become the watchwords of the new judicial administration.
With pressure to improve administration has come pressure to improve
the processes and structures associated with the development of
administrative policy. Chief judges, for example, can no longer rely as much
on the informal methods they used for resolving problems within the circuit
when the organization was smaller and slower. As Russell Wheeler and
Charles Nihan report in their 1982 study of administration in the federal
circuits:
28. The District Judges Association first tried to negotiate uniform riles, but gave tIp after six
%ears. Fhe Lawver Representative Committee of1 Ihe Northern )istrict of CalifOrnia then interviewed
each judge in the district and compiled a manual. Remarks of Chief Judge James R. Browning,
(;eneral Session of ihe Tenth Circuti Judicial Conference (Jackson Hole, Wvo. 1988). See infra p.
102, discussing current efl'oris io achieve grealer uniformity inl local rItiles.
29. W. HtEYI)EBRAND & C. SERON, ITHE RATIONArirZATI ION OF JCslCE: HIIsTIORICAI CIIANGF AND
INSTITUTIONAl CONTRADIC TIONS OF TIlE AMERICAN JUIICI,. SYSTEM (fordicoming).
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Courts of appeals are in transition from one era to another . T.... he chief judge's
personal attention to detail took root when the circuits were smaller and the
responsibility for overall supervision was less onerous. Increasingly, chiefjudges wish
to avoid detailed personal involvement in all aspects of circuit business and thus are
seeking to delegate much of this responsibility to the circuit executive and to
committees of judges . . . . Perhaps the most important impression we have gained
from this inquiry is that chief circuit judges are facing a double bind created by the
growth in the size of the judiciary, on the one hand, and the desire to maintain
traditions of close personal relations with their colleagues, on the other.
3t
Nowhere has the pressure to rethink administrative processes and revamp
governing institutions been felt more keenly than in the Ninth Circuit.
Unprecedented numbers of cases, of district courts, ofjudges, and of support
personnel have created pressure to split the circuit, which has forced leaders
in the Ninth Circuit to take seriously the problems of coordinating a massive
judicial enterprise and rendering it accountable to its attentive publics.
Strong circuit governance represents one solution to the problem of
mediating between the varied constituencies that make up the circuit. During
the James Browning years (1976-88), when the circuit grew rapidly and the
pressure to improve the circuit's performance was great, innovation in
matters of governance became a key strategy for accommodating the burden
of numbers and accountability to the reality of independent, nearly
autonomous judges.
III
DEMOCRATIZING CIRCUIT GOVERNANCE
The exclusion of district judges from membership on the circuit councils
and the Judicial Conference of the United States never sat well with district
judges.3 t The Conference welcomed district judges on its committees from
the beginning. ChiefJustice Charles Evans Hughes initiated this policy, and it
quickly became institutionalized, but there was significant opposition to the
idea of extending membership on the Conference itself' to district judges. "'
The effort to achieve representation at both levels began early, with Ninth
Circuit district judges playing a leading role in lobbying the Judicial
Conference." With Chief Justice Earl Warren's active support, Congress in
1957 finally expanded the membership of the Judicial Conference to include
one district judge from each circuit.34 Selection of the circuit's district judge
representative occurs during the annual circuit conference.3 5 In most circuits,
30. R. \WHEELIER & C. NInAN, AIMINISTERIN(; TE FEI)DERAi JUIlCIAL CIRCUrrs: A SImRVEN OF
CHIEF jt.JUGES' APt'ROACHE'S AND PROC.I)URFS 9-10 (1982).
31. P. lisn, siipr note 6, at 248-54, 380-84. C/. S. FLA.NDERS &J. Mcl)ERMOIT, s111r note 19, at
50-51.
32. P. Fisn, spra note 6, at 274-75.
33. Id. at 253.
34. Act of Atug. 28, 1957, Pub. I. No. 85-202, 71 Sta. 476 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 331 (West Supp. 1989)).
35. -T he district judge to be summoned fr1out eaC h judiCial circuit shall be chosen by the circuit
at the anIual jid it icial conflrencC ol the circuit ... and shall serve as a member of the conference for
thi ec successive years." 28 U.S.C.A. § 331 (West Supp. 1989). The stattc envisions participation
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including the Ninth, the position is elective, an exception to the usual rule in
the federal courts. These elections also elicit atypical judicial behavior, with
district judges campaigning for the post, sometimes with a campaign manager
and a platform of issues.
Court of appeals judges were no more anxious to relinquish their
monopoly on the circuit councils than they had been to give up full control of
the Judicial Conference. No one objected to allowing district judges to attend
an occasional meeting as a guest of the council, when their input would be
helpful. However, there was strong resistance to the idea that district judges
should be on an equal footing with appellate judges in setting circuit policy,
particularly if that policy might affect procedures or resources of the court of
appeals. Again, a few district judges in the Ninth Circuit were active in the
effort to achieve representation, but they were opposed by appellate judges in
their own circuit.3"'
A. District Judge Representation: By Invitation Only
During the 1970's the Ninth Circuit, like most others, experimented with
various compromises, which fell short of full representation for districtjudges
on the council.3 7  In 1972, members of the circuit's District Judges'
Association were invited to attend in an "advisory capacity" when the chief
judge deemed their presence appropriate.3  They were generally invited to
sit in on part of one or two of the council's eight annual meetings, which
occurred in conjunction with meetings of the court of appeals, but a whole
year may have passed without a district judge observer attending a single
council meeting. :''
Judge Browning took steps to give the district judges more voice in circuit
affairs shortly after he assumed the chief judgeship. In 1976 he instituted a
separate organization for the district court judges to voice issues of concern to
the district courts, the Conference of Chief Judges of District Courts.4 In
May 1977, in anticipation of eventual district judge participation on the
council, he proposed to divide the day-long court/council meetings into two
sessions. The morning session would consider problems specific to the court
of appeals, such as discussion of the need for additional appellate judges.
The afternoon session would concern circuit-wide or district-level issues, such
as retirement provisions and circuit conference matters. Two district judge
by both appellate and district judges. In the Ninth Circuit the district judges elect a candidate, and
the appellate judges affirm the selection b% an automatic unanimous consent.
36. P. Fisir, supra note 6, at 382.
37. R. NVIlIEEIfER & C. NIuIAN, So/na'1 note 30, at 3-4.
38. Resolution of the .Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit, adopted July 12, 1972.
39. l.etter fiom Chief judgejanes R. Browning to Chief Judge Bailey Brown (Aug. 30, 1978).
40. By-Laws of the Ninth Circuit Conference of Chief judges (undated). This conference
became the model for biannual gatherings of the magistrates and chief bank ruptcy judges and their
clet-ks. Materials distributed for each conference are similar: information on matters pending before
Congress, the courts, and the United States judicial Conference: and updates from the
Administrative Office, the Circuit Executive, and relevant comnnittees of the council. The agenda
features reports from committees, from the chief judge, and front the circuit executive.
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representatives, the president of the District Judges' Association and the
chairman of the executive committee of the Conference of Chief (District)
Judges, would be invited to the afternoon session as non-voting members.
4
'
This proposal met with strong opposition from a few circuit judges,
although others supported the move. One judge reported that he was "very
much opposed to the idea of permitting district judges to participate in
Council sessions" because the presence of the two district judges "would
destroy both the efficiency and the collegiality of our Council sessions."-
42
The council agreed to divide its agenda, but not to invite the district judges to
attend the afternoon sessions on a regular basis.
In an effort to strengthen the circuit as an institution, even at a risk to
collegiality within his own court, Judge Browning issued the invitation
himself. Judge Browning relied on the authority of the council's 1972
resolution, which left the matter of district judge attendance to the discretion
of the chief judge. 4:" From that point on, District Judge Spencer Williams,
who had organized the District Judges Association, began to attend council
meetings regularly as a non-voting observer.
Full membership on the circuit councils was not available to the district
judges until 1981, when the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct
and Disability Act took effect. 44 The Act required councils to include two to
three district judge representatives, depending on the number of appellate
judges on the council.4' To appease concerns that the restructured council
might be inclined toward too active a role, Congressman Kastenmeier drafted
a provision that allowed a circuit to limit the power of its council: "Unless an
impediment to the administration of justice is involved, regular business of
the courts need not be referred to the council.
' 4 6
The district and appellate judges did not generally agree on the issue of
council membership. But the real prospect that Congress might take
jurisdiction over judicial misconduct away from the circuits and centralize it in
Washington discouraged circuit judges from working actively against
representation for district judges. District judges began lobbying for
41. MeI 11ldun I ou CIel Judge lames Browning to Associates (May 3, 1977). Ihe concept
of i dul agenda, With Curit Of" .ipC llS buSinCSS ClCin'ly dilerentiated from coincil business, was later
in coI ipOr)Cd into bCIudicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and )isability Act of' 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-458, § 2, 91 Stait. 2035 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 332(a)(I)(c)(1982)).
42. Memoirandmii to Associates (May 9, 1977). Another judge responded to the Browning
miemoianiduIm with "strong reservations" ,b)ont regular participation by disirict judges.
Memora.ndu to Associates (May 1(, 1977).
43. iltter fi-orn Browning to Brown, ,CuC/i note 39. T he liaison connmittee elected to accept
Judge Browning's invitation by sending only oICe of their number to council meetings. Id.
44. Pub. . No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1982)).
45. /d. 1The Iaw required at least two districti judges Cl a council made tip of tip to five appellate
judges. aind three district judgce Icpresentaiives in councils with more than six appellate COit
members (codilied at 28 U.S.C. § 332(a)(I)(c) (1982)).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(3) (1982) (as amended by § 2(c) of thCJtdiCial Council's Reform and
ljudicial (onduct and Disabilitv Act of' 1980. Pub. 1.. No. 96-458. 94 Stal. 2035) (codified in scattered
scciinls o1 28 U.S.C. (1982)). Fora discussion o the legislative history of the Act, see Burbank, snpra
1<l<" 21, .1t 291-308.
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representation in May 1977 with a resolution by the Fifth Circuit District
Judges' Association calling for equal proportions of district and circuit judges
on the councils and requesting action by the Judicial Conference. Judge Elmo
Hunter, Chair of the Conference Committee on Court Administration,
ordered a stud, of council activities, which revealed that two-thirds of those
affected by council decisions were district judges. Yet most appellate judges
opposed any representation for district judges on the councils. 4 7
Meanwhile some appellate judges, prompted by the fear that Congress
might divest the circuits of power to resolve misconduct complaints, began to
work actively for district judge membership on the councils. Congress at that
time was considering two bills that would have eliminated council jurisdiction
over misconduct, one sponsored by Senator Nunn, the other by Senator
DeConcini. Judge J. Clifford Wallace argued for equal numbers of district
and appellate judges on councils and election of all representatives in a May
1978 article revealingly entitled The Niunn Bill An Unneeded Compromise of
Judicial Independence, and he testified before Congress in support of equal
representation in May 1979.48 ChiefJudge Browning also testified in favor of
maintaining council authority over discipline, though he did not take a
position at that time on the election of representatives or the precise make-up
of the councils. 41- However, the steps Browning had taken to include district
judge observers on the Ninth Circuit council apparently impressed
Representative Kastenmeier and encouraged him to believe that the circuits
could operate effectively if council membership were extended to district
judges. -',"
B. The Implications of Equality
The Ninth Circuit responded to the 1980 Act by drastically reorganizing
its council, a move encouraged by a roughly contemporaneous growth in the
already numerous ranks of appellate judges. 5' In most of the other circuits,
where the number of circuit judges was much smaller, the councils simply
47. According to a Nov. 1978 poll, the sentinmnt on the Courts of appeals was more than two-to-
one against inclusion: the district judges, on the other hand, were oveirwhclningly of the opposite
persuasion. The restuts of'the poll showed 81 appellate Judges opposed to inclusion and 39 in favo
of inclusion. Of the district judges polled, 16 opposed inclusion and 377 favored inclusion.
Telephone interview with Judge Ehno Hunter (March 9, 1989).
48. Wallace, The .Vuin Bill: .-In inneeded (ompiomise iio Judicial Independenre. 61 JUI)CAtRE 476,
480 (1978). See also.]udicial Tenure ad Discipline, 1979-80." Iearings Before the lonse Subcomint. oil Couis,
Civil Liberliei and the iidmistation qfJislice of the lhose Comm. on the Jndiciarv, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979) (statement of ,JudgeJ . Clifl'ord Wallace).
49. Judicial Tenie and Discipline, 1979-80. Ihe ings Brlow tlie Hltouse Siibconmr. on Coiuts, Civil
Librlie, and the .Idminis ationii ofi slice o/ the Ho use Comm. on theJudiiaiv. 96th Cong., I st Sess. (1979)
(statement of Chief Judge James R. Browning).
50. Telephone interview with judge Elmo Hunter, supba note 47.
51. Judge Browning appointed a committee, composed of three appellate and three district
judges with himself presiding, to dev'elop a proposal. See Report of (he Committee on Restructtiring
the Circuit Council (Dec. 5, 1980). The mauer was debated in council and then put to all judges in
the circuit for a Vote. lhe judicial vote was 76 to 3. Minutes of Coutr and Council Meeting, l)ec. 12,
1980.
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added two or three district judges to their membership.52  In the Ninth
Circuit, however, if the mandated three district judges had simply been added
to a council made up of court of appeals judges, the council would have
numbered an ungainly twenty-six.
Equal representation emerged as the unanimous recommendation of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, a surprising result considering the earlier
opposition on that court to any representation for district judges. 53 Judge
Browning defused opposition by chairing the committee charged with
implementing the equal representation policy, and by appointing to it the
circuit judge who was most opposed to district judge representation. 54 Judge
Browning suggested that the committee, which was made up of equal
numbers of district and appellate judges, include any protections necessary to
ensure acceptance of district judges on the council.
The committee moved quickly to draft a rule that included equal
representation, but with the proviso that
the Council will not intervene in the internal functions of the Court of Appeals or of
any district court unless it is determined by a majority of the judges of the particular
court or two thirds of the members of ti Council that intervention is appropriate and
necessary because an impediment to the administration of justice is involved.15
However, that stipulation alone did not assuage the concerns of the circuit
judges about potential overreaching. The court of appeals instructed the
committee to redraft the provision delineating the council's membership to
include a definition of a quorum of the council. The committee prepared a
new draft requiring a quorum of five, two of whom had to be district judges
and two of whom had to be circuit judges other than the chief judge. The
revised rule also provided that action on most matters would require a
majority of those present, including at least one district judge and one circuit
judge other than the chief judge.5 13
The plan, with minor revisions, was submitted to all active article III
judges in the Ninth Circuit and was approved seventy-six to three. The final
unanimous court of appeals vote took place April 17, 1981, and the new rule
took effect the following October.
52. Neisser, The .Vew Fedoal Judicial Disciplt ie Act: Somt, Qet lion. Congress Didn' t hswe, 65
JtUDcATURE 143. 144 n.43 (1981).
53. Chief Judge Browning's Report to the 1981 Circutit Conference Utine 29. 1981) (reporting
unanimous vote from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circiit).
54. The committee was appointed on Nov. 20, 1980. It was made up of'Judges Robert
Browning, J. Clifford Wallace. Joseph Sneed, and Otto Skopil from the court of appeals, and.Judges
Robert McNichols. Robert Peckharn. and Robert Belloni from Ithe district courts. Judge Sneed was a
leader in arguing for maintaining exclusivity.
55. The committee thus made mandatory% what the legislation left optional. See text
accompanying note 45. Rtule Governing the Restructuring of the Judicial Council of the Ninth
Circuit. Provision I (Dec. 23, 1980). [he rule was amended Mar. 6, 1981, to include only active
judges in the tallying of alfected judges.
56. Rule Governing the Restructuring of the Judicial Council of tie Ninth Circuit, supme note 55.
Provision 2. The rule required that action on complaints against judges or magistrares be supported
by a majorit' of all members of the council other than the chief judge.
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The decision to go beyond congressional requirements and equalize the
representation of district and circuit judges had profound implications for
governance in the Ninth Circuit. The appellate judges forsook their
preeminent role in governing the circuit and became simply one of the two
levels represented on the circuit council, accepting a loss of power that some
of them predicted would cause serious problems in the governance of the
circuit.
Judge Joseph Sneed, who argued against the inclusion of district judges
when the matter was before Congress, cast the issue of equal representation
in terms of effectiveness .5 7 A council that equalized representation of district
and circuit judges, he speculated, would please neither group, and would
stimulate "oligarchic" tendencies in the council) '8 Emboldened by its district
judge representatives, the council would take up issues it had treated as off
limits before. Courts would try to deflect the intrusion of the council into
their affairs by declaring as many issues as possible to be "court business,"
thereby avoiding council action. The result would be an ineffective council.
Judge Sneed appears to have been mistaken in anticipating that the
presence of district judges on the council would come to be regarded as a
mistake, but he was right in identifying their inclusion as a turning point in
circuit governance. District judges not only became partners in governance,
but their participation on the council pointed the way to further changes.
Soon magistrates and bankruptcy judges joined the council as observers.
Senior judges noted that they themselves lacked representation and gained
observer status. The once heretical idea that those with a stake in the
deliberations of the council deserve a chance to participate in those
deliberations had within a few years become orthodoxy in the Ninth Circuit.
The reorganization of the council to serve circuit-wide needs encouraged
the court of appeals to develop its own institutions for handling issues arising
at that level. Judge Browning had laid the groundwork for this understanding
in 1977 when he divided the council's agenda into matters of primary concern
to the court of appeals and matters of circuit-wide interest. With the
reorganization of the council, the court of appeals began meeting separately.
In part because of its size, but also because many judges showed no particular
interest in administration, the court came to rely on a seven-member
executive committee to make both routine and emergency decisions and to
evaluate proposals and recommend action to the court.
Splitting the council from the court of appeals also had an impact on the
organization of administrative support in the circuit. As the circuit
executive's office came to be identified more closely with the council, the
circuit executive's relationship with the clerk of the court of appeals began to
57. Judge Sneed presented the arguments against altering the existing striCtluiC of the councils
in a memorandum circulated to the appellate judges in the summer of 1979. I'he memnioranduni was
drafted for submission at a congressional hearing, but was never made part of the congressional
record.
58. Id. at 5.
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change. In a sequence of steps typical of the process of institutional reform in
the Ninth Circuit, the circuit first experimented with an arrangement by which
the clerk took over appeals-related supervisory and procurement functions
formerly within the circuit executive's jurisdiction. Then, after discussion in
the executive committee of the court of appeals, the judges voted to create a
new position, Court of Appeals Executive, "to be responsible for the day-to-
day operations of the Court of Appeals.-59
The effort to define a more active role for the smaller, more
representative, circuit council began shortly after the 1981 reorganization.
Judge Browning, relying on the management skills of his circuit executive at
the time, William E. Davis, initiated many changes in the council.""1 Davis
suggested, and the council implemented, quarterly meetings organized
around a written agenda. The agenda began with a report by the chiefjudge
on the state of the circuit and included reports of committees and a report
from the circuit executive on progress toward objectives outlined in an annual
action plan."' The specter of a divided circuit motivated both men to develop
and implement these reforms. "If the circuit splits," Browning laughingly
told Davis one day, "it's your fault."
ForJudge Browning, the objective of enhancing the council's effectiveness
involved broadening, as much as possible, the base from which the council
could draw ideas and suggestions. This meant developing criteria for council
membership that would allow for the representation of diverse interests.
Arbitrary appointments and politicking for office were to be avoided. The
solution was to create a council composed of delegates, with members coming
onto the council by virtue of their status or seniority in some separate realn.
Thus, three of the circuit judges serve by virtue of their seniority in the
administrative units; the Fourth Circuit-judge member represents the
Executive Committee of the Court of Appeals. District-judge members are
two members of the Conference of District Court Chief Judges selected by
seniority as chief judges, the Ninth Circuit's district-judge representative to
theJudicial Conference of the United States, and the president of the District
Judges' Association.
Observers represent organized constituencies, as do the liaison
committees the council created to maintain close contact with key non-judicial
officers, such as district court clerks and probation officers. With Judge
Browning's encouragement, these constituencies were organized to meet
regularly to share ideas and discuss common problems. There has been no
59. Minutes of Ninth Circuit Council. Nov. 17, 1987, at 2. See IMemorandUm Froin Cathy A.
Catterson (Court of Appeals Clerk) to Chief Judge Browning (Sept. 28. 1987). and Fiscal Year 1990
Position Rcquiriements, outlining the new court of appeals executivC's needs lor increased staff.
60. William Davis, who left the Ninth Circuit in 1986, won awards for his earlier work as court
administrator for the state of Kentucky. See L.A. Daily J., Apr. 6, 1987. § 1, at I, col. 3. He now
serves as director of the Administrative Oflice of the C(Xtiits f01r California.
61. Davis outlined most of' these ideas in a 1981 memorandum to Judge Browning.
IMemoi-anduim from William E. Davis to James Browvning (Aug. 31, 1981). He offered a similar series
of organizational proposals to the ct1111 of appeals. Memorandtim from William E. Davis to janies
Browning (Mar. I, 1982).
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effort, though, to make such meetings the only source of information about
the council; minutes of council meetings are distributed to all judges and
available to any member of the Ninth Circuit community. The circuit even has
a newsletter, 91h Circuit News.
The council's work is conducted through a combination of active standing
and ad hoc committees. An executive committee handles routine and
emergency issues arising between meetings. The committees were
encouraged to take their mandates seriously by the requirement that they
report regularly to the council. Judge Browning reasoned that the daily press
of work on the council judges required the precaution of regular reporting.
In staffing council committees, Judge Browning and the circuit executive's
office made an effort to include as many members of the Ninth Circuit
community as possible, but especially new judges who could thus become
oriented to thinking in terms of the business of the circuit' -' The
development of a wide-ranging, well-populated committee system on the
council was also intended to legitimate the council in the eyes of its
constituents and to inspire judges, lawyers, and professional staff to think in
terms of their circuit and its interests at the national level. Committee
jurisdictions and membership were organized to parallel those of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, and thereby to ensure that the interests of
the circuit would be effectively represented at that level.6"
Were the council an executive body in a bureaucratic organization,
attention to the creation of opportunities for discussion within and across
organizational segments might be desirable, but would hardly be perceived as
essential to efficient operations. In a court system there are no other options.
Orders from a body of legislator-judges, no matter how representative, will be
resented by many judges, and resisted completely by a few. Circuit councils
have avoided the embarrassment of defiance by issuing few orders.64
The leader's task in such a setting is to create opportunities for collegial
exchange, to provide information that will be helpful in choosing among
alternatives, to engage in friendly persuasion in order to point out the
advantages of change or to create embarrassment about failure to conform
with expectations, and to protect the institutional interests of the
62. In a 1987 report to chief'circulit judges and circuit eXC tI vs Cs in other circuits, Ninth Circuilt
Executive Francis Bremson outlined three types of commituees on the council: circuit conference
committees conference and liaison committees (reporting on ile concerns of the conferences of
chief district judges, chief bankruptcy judges, and United States magistrates, and the committees of
bankruptcy clerks, district clerks, federal public defenders, and probation officers): and advisors
committees and task forces set up to address particular issues of wide coIccein in the circuit, such as
alternative dispute resolution and evaluation of local rules. Br emson noted that "committee
members come from every district within the circuit." Memorandumi from Francis Breimson oil
Operating Procedures for the Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit, at 3 (undated).
63. Chief judge Browning and the circuit executive also made an effor to have a Ninth Circuit
representative on every Conference committee, and anyone in tie circuit who was invited to serve on
a Judicial Conference committee automatically became a member of the relevant circuit committee.
When the Judicial Conference alters its committee structure, as it did in 1988. council committees
are adjusted accordingly.
64. P. Fisi, sitpra note 6, at 406-26.
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organization. Judge Browning nurtured institutions that would assist him in
these endeavors, including an historical society to help provide the circuit
with a sense of its past 65 and a regional research center.
IV
NINTH CIRCUIT GOVERNMENT IN ACTION
The obvious question is whether Judge Browning's effort to define a
meaningful, albeit circumscribed, role for circuit governance has been
successful. Judge Browning saw circuit government as a challenge to his skills
in persuasion. Judges and other members of the Ninth Circuit community
had to be persuaded that the institutions that made decisions on their behalf
were legitimate. Skeptics in Washington also had to be persuaded to take
circuit government seriously. In their reluctance to undertake unpleasant but
necessary regulatory tasks, the circuits had allowed themselves to become
almost supernumeraries in the administrative process. As Judge Browning
noted in his 1982 report to the Ninth Circuit:
For fortv years the judicial councils of the circuits failed to discharge the
responsibilities imposed on them by Congress .... .. But life moves on. The
administrative finctions left unpcrforimed by the judicial cou, ncils were necessarily
assumed bv othcrs. Over the last fortv years administrative authority gradualy
conccnrrated in the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Administrative
Oflice. and the Fcdceal Judicial Center.66
It would not be easy, Browning warned, to reclaim this authority from
Washington.
Has the Ninth Circuit fashioned a meaningful role for itself' in an
administrative system where power tends to be concentrated in the periphery
and the center, but not between the two? The unusual energy and
imagination Judge Browning devoted to the task, along with his unusually
long tenure as chief judge, suggests that the Ninth Circuit should be
considered exemplary in circuit governance. Are the innovations of the
Browning period viewed as legitimate and desirable by members of the Ninth
Circuit community? What can be learned from this struggle to create a
regional judicial polity?
A. The Circuit's Agenda
Governance is a process with no single, easily definable product. At the
federal appellate level, however, it is at least possible to discern the tasks of
government as defined by Congress and the Judicial Conference and to
evaluate how the circuit discharges its mandate. The activities of the circuit
council offer a useful starting point for this analysis because it is to the
65. The Ninth Circuit Historical Society solicits members who are invited to participate in
historical scholarship. I( also publlishes a journal entitled ii'estern Legal listo l .
66. 1982 Annual Report of the Ninth Circuit, at 15. The Federal Judicial Center was founded in
1967 to serve as the Washington-based research and planning arm ol the federal court system. Its
authority is outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 620 (1968) See also Wheeler, Empirical Research and M/ue Politics of
.]udinial .IdminisIra/ion." CrCatig Me Federaludicial ('en/er. LAw & CONTENri. PRoBs .. Summer 1988. at 13.
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councils that Congress and the Judicial Conference have spoken most clearly.
The duties of the councils, contained in a variety of statutory and regulatory
provisions, are a product of an accretion of legislation. These duties can be
summarized as follows:
* Resolution of complaints of judicial misconduct and certification
of judicial disability;
* Intra-circuit dispute resolution;
• Scrutiny and approval of certain administrative proposals
emanating from the district courts, including designation of
schedules and staff allocations;
* Supervision of the condition of dockets, criminal adjudication,
and the use of jurors throughout the circuit, including responsibility
to take action to assist a judge who has a large backload of pending
cases; and
* Evaluation and recommendation of personnel and equipment
needs.
Most of these duties consume relatively little of the Ninth Circuit's
collective attention. Judicial misconduct and disability issues, following the
pattern elsewhere, are most often handled by the chiefjudge and court staff
and seldom come before the council for action." 7 The dispute resolution
function of the council has almost never come into play in the Ninth Circuit,
although on one of the few occasions when it did, the issue split the council in
half. The four district judge representatives voted unanimously in opposition
to the four appellate judge representatives, rendering the vote invalid
according to the council's charter, which was designed to short-circuit just
such divisions.:" The council spends more time with required approvals of
district plans and proposals (for juror utilization, appointment of assigned
counsel,judicial assignments, and so on) and of local rules, but these activities
are generally uncontroversial and elicit little discussion.
The council, through its committees, spends much more time on caseload
management and personnel issues. Some committees (the task force on
alternative dispute resolution, the space committee, and the jury management
and utilization committee) are designed to address specific management
issues directly; others deal with the organizational prerequisites of an effective
system (the intra-circuit assignment committee, and liaison committees with
magistrates, bankruptcy courts, and clerks); and still others are concerned
with the circuit's resource and information base (the statistics committee and
the automation and technology committee). The circuit executive conducts
67. Reiger, spra note 20, at 58-59. In 1986, for example, 277 complaints were concluded, 86%
by the chief judges. The remaining 39 were dismissed by the judicial councils. 1d. at 59.
68. At issue was the allocation of space in the Central District of California. A circuit judge had
taken space the district judges thought they were entitled to use. [he district judges brought the
matter to the council repeatedly and in June 1987 sought an order. It was not until after the vote that
Chief Judge Browning and the circuit executive realized the vote was in violation of' the cotncil's
charter. By the next meeting the problem had been resolved.
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research on improving caseload flow, and the chiefjudge and council have not
hesitated to ask the Federal Judicial Center to conduct additional studies.
The circuit executive also drafts the annual action plan, which ChiefJudge
Browning instituted in 1982 to focus the energies of the circuit on problems
in the system. The plan is made up of ideas solicited from members of the
Ninth Circuit community and, to an even greater extent, of ideas contributed
by the professional staff. The plan is designed to encourage the council to
become a policymaking, priority-setting body, notjust a regulator of functions
required by central authorities.
The attention the circuit devotes to studying its caseload helps support the
effort to make its needs for personnel and resources known to the Judicial
Conference and Congress. Lobbying for additional personnel and equipment
has become an art form in the Ninth Circuit. The council is sometimes the
nerve center for operations, but other governing institutions within the circuit
are also involved in these issues. When the issue of enhanced retirement
benefits for magistrates was before Congress, for example, Ninth Circuit
magistrates invited the director of the Administrative Office to address them
on the subject at their annual magistrates' conference. The director gave
them details on the leanings of various members of Congress and urged them
to contact their representatives directly. The magistrates also went on record
in favor of hiring a professional lobbyist to pursue the matter further."1
Externally inflicted threats to the circuit's well-being are also likely to
evoke aggressive action from a variety of governing resources. Judge
Browning became personally involved in the effort to keep the bankruptcy
courts operating after the Supreme Court's decision in NVorIhern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. .Mlarathon Pipeline Co., 7o and he worked equally hard to keep
the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in its present form. His style, according to
one observer, was to "grab problems by the throat and not let go."
The circuit treads much more lightly when it focuses on the management
problems of specific article III judges. When the council learns that a judge
has a backlog problem, the chiefjudge generally contacts the judge and offers
assistance. Sometimes, however, the council's statistics committee or a friend
on the council may call the judge in question to express concern; often such
contacts are made through the appropriate chief district judge. The council
has never found it necessary to make formal requests for changes in
management practices that allow judges to become seriously in arrears in
their work, though the statistics committee has on a few occasions sent a
visiting judge to assist in revamping procedures. Intra-circuit assignment
policy also encourages timeliness. If a judge has five or more cases under
69. Minutes of Ninth Circuit Magistrates Conference, Sun Valley, Idaho, Aug. 19, 1986. 1hc
magistrates and bankruIptcy judges wlere Ultimately successful in their elorts 1o get enhanced benefits
in the 100th Session of Congress.
70. 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (holding that Bankruptcy Reform Act's broad grant of jurisdiction to
bankruptcy judges violated article III of the United States Constitntion).
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advisement for sixty days or more, he or she is not available for intra-circuit
assignment.
Just getting some judges to report their case disposition statistics is a
delicate matter. Many judges ignored reporting requirements until the
1980's, when the chief judge and the council's statistics committee began to
press for compliance. Now only a few refuse outright to cooperate, though
there are persistent rumors that some judges manipulate their statistics by
last-minute assignments of long-pending cases and by other devices. At this
writing the council is on the verge of taking a more active role in prodding
judges to comply with reporting requirements, and the circuit executive's
office is exploring the possibilities of installing a computerized reporting
system.
Judges on the Ninth Circuit clearly give each other wide berth to make
their own administrative decisions in their own courts. Judicial government
works around this major constraint on its activities by emphasizing its role in
education, planning, lobbying, and consensus-building, and by handling its
regulatory duties with extreme circumspection. That most delicate of
regulatory duties, controlling judicial misconduct, is handled informally and
in person whenever possible, with the chief judge acting as emissary of the
council.
The potentially controversial matter of approving changes in the local
rules of constituent courts is also handled with care. Until very recently the
council treated approvals as a purely procedural matter of ensuring adequate
notice and comment, even though "interdistrict uniformity" is stated as a goal
in the advisory committee notes that accompany the relevant section of the
Federal Rules. 7 ' "Uniformity in the federal system," according to one Ninth
Circuit judge interviewed in connection with this project, "is the biggest joke
going." Congress finally mandated a more thorough review of local rule
changes in November 1988.72 The Judicial Conference has also become
involved in the issue; a committee of the conference has proposed
amendments to the Federal Rules that would "provide uniform procedures
and forms for technical matters which have traditionally been the subject of
local rulemaking.'" 7 3
71. FEn. R. Civ. P. 83. Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules (1985 amendment): " he
expectation is that the judicial council will examine all local rules, including those currently in effect,
with an eve toward determining whether they are valid and consistent with the Federal Rules. Promote
iner-dish'ici 1iformily ad efflcieny, and do not undermine the hasic objectives of the Federal Rules'
(emphasis added).
72. Judicial Improvements and Access to.Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 403(a)(2), 102 Stat.
4651 (effective Dec. 1, 1988) (current version at 28 U.S.C.A. § 332(d)(4) (West Supp. 1989)). This
section specifies that the council shall periodically review the circuit's local rules foir conformity to the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
73. Preliminary l)rafi of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and
the Federal Rules of Civil Pirocedure, reprinted in 124 F.R.D. 431 (1989). The proposed
administrative rules wsould "supersede all previous local rules, orders and other directives
promulgated by each court or any judge of the court." Id. at 459. Tlhe rules cover such matters as
format of cover sheets, proof of service requirements, technical pleading rules, and copying
requirements.
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Commitment to a model of regional judicial government that is primarily
facilitative is evident in the Ninth Circuit's efforts to decentralize the
budgetary process. Spending for courts traditionally has been handled almost
entirely from Washington through the Administrative Office, which negotiates
with Congress, sets priorities, and administers the budget. The
Administrative Office makes no effort to include the circuits in these
decisions. Each circuit executive submits a budget to assist in the process of
assessing needs, but these budgets are not used in channeling funds to the
circuits, nor is the circuit executive involved in allocations to constituent
courts within the circuit. Judges contact the Administrative Office if they need
extra office supplies or new furniture, an arrangement that some judges find
quite advantageous because the Administrative Office turns down few
requests. Several judges I interviewed likened the agency to a sugar daddy
who dispenses money from an unseen pocket of unknown depth.
Judge Browning and his circuit executive worked hard to change this
system, which they considered inefficient, unreliable, and wasteful. 74 In 1982
the circuit executive proposed a decentralization plan that would place
authority for approval of budget requests in the circuit council, and
decentralized budgeting became an item in the 1983 and subsequent annual
action plans. The idea of decentralized budgeting, stalled at first, has gained
ground rapidly in recent years in the Administrative Office and Judicial
Conference as Congress has become less generous in its allotments.
It now appears likely that both the district councils and the circuit councils
will be loci of distributive authority, and theJudicial Conference will supervise
the process. Just how this change will be accomplished remains unclear, for
districts and circuits vary in their capacity to ensure that their needs are met.
The role of professional administrators in the distributive process also
remains unclear, and judges are sharply divided on this issue. "Decisions
about who gets what," one judge remarked to me, "should be made by
judges." The Administrative Office is currently experimenting with several
plans for decentralizing authority over controllable items in the budget, and
three Ninth Circuit districts are involved in this experiment. 75
The campaign to decentralize budgeting and other circuit activities
described here reveal the pattern of government during the Browning years.
When the circuit's autonomy or resources were threatened, Judge Browning
moved decisively to protect local interests. The threat might be long-term,
like centralized control over the budget process, or immediate, like the Nunn
74. "Eventually this reform will have its way; it must if the growing judicial establishment is to
operate eliciently.- Address by Jaies R. Browning, State of the Ninth Circuit (Aug. 13, 1984).
75. The experiment began in Nov. 1987 and is scheduled to run for three years. In the Ninth
Circuit it involves the Northern District of, California, the Western 1)istrict of' Washington, and the
District of Arizona. Outside the Ninth Circuit the Cot rt of Appeals for the Second Circuit. the
District Cotri f01 tlhe Soutltln l)istrict of New York, and the council of the Elesventh Circuit arc
participating. The Administrative Office is also decentralizing some building projects, permitting
court clerks to make decisions il) to $5000. delegating decisions between $5000 and $25.000 to staff"
in the circuit executive's office, witl some council oversighl and requiring Full cotncil review of
decisions in the $25.000-$500.000 range.
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bill. Chief Judge Browning and other leaders worked through the circuit's
governing institutions, but it was the energy and talents of a few individuals
that lent coherence to the effort.
The approach was much different when the issue was self-regulation.
There Judge Browning's persuasive powers were directed at the Ninth Circuit
community, not Washington, and the problem was to improve performance,
not to precipitate decisive action. In such instances government took on a
more institutional, less personal cast, and information-sharing, example,
exhortation, and embarrassment were the levers for change.
B. The Consent of the Governed
There is every evidence that the judicial rank and file supported Judge
Browning's approach to governance and would have strongly resisted more
activist circuit government. In conducting this research I interviewed most of
the circuit's chief district judges, as well as an assortment of other district
judges, bankruptcy judges, magistrates, members of the circuit executive's
office, and other professional personnel. 7 The circuit membership at large,
including litigators, was asked to discuss the issue of governance in a series of
break-out sessions during the 1988 circuit conference, and notes on each of
those sessions were available to me.
A survey of each constituency within the circuit would have added a
scientific gloss to this seemingly unsystematic data-gathering procedure. But
in estimating what might be learned from such an undertaking, one should
take into account the sentiment that predominated in the break-out sessions:
Governance is a low-profile, generally benign activity in the Ninth Circuit,
despite the elaborate institutional transformation that has occurred there.
"The council," as one district judge remarked, "just doesn't seem to influence
my life." A chief district judge expressed the same sentiment in a personal
interview: "District judges don't worry about administration-until six
months before they become chief judge." Fish describes this attitude in his
1973 analysis of administration in the federal courts: "Lower court judges
thus may identify generally with the system of which they are a part.
Specifically, they relate to their own courts, not to more remote national and
76. Each of the ten chief district judges I interviewed had either sat on the council in the past or
was currently serving. Each could thus speak trorn two vantage points: as a circuit legislator with
inside knowledge of the council's work, and as a circuit citizen with district-wide administrative
,esponsibility. These interviews were condtcted by telephone in Sept. and Oct. 1988.
NonzIudicial personnel interviewed include a member of 'tle staff attorney's office, the clerk of the
court of appeals (now circuit court exective), a puhlic defender, the current and former circuit
executives, and two members of the current circuit executive's staff. lhese interviews were
conducted during Oct. 14-15, 1987, visits to the Court of Appeals for tle Ninth Circuit and District
Cotrt for the Northern District of California.
tntlerviews with non-article IIl personnel were in person (chief bankruptcv judge and a second
hankrul)tcyjudge. Oct. 15, 1987) and by telephone (a magistrate, in Dec. 1988). 1 also interviewed a
setior judge in San Francisco (Oct. 15, 1987).
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regional agencies such as the Judicial Conference, its committees, the
Administrative Office, or the circuit judicial councils." 7 7
The decision to add district judges to the council appears to have satisfied
any concern at the district level about the legitimacy of the council as a
governing body. Every chief district judge interviewed stressed the
significance of the decision to give district judges four slots on the council, but
none detected any pressure for more representation, despite what several
described as the "natural enmity" between trial and appellate judges. 78 At
the break-out sessions, the only criticism of the system voiced by district
judges was that the one-year term for district judge representatives was too
brief. (Three of the four district judge positions are defined as one-year
terms; court of appeals representatives serve for two years.)
Judges on the court of appeals also accept the council as legitimate,
perhaps because it has little impact on their everyday lives. As one circuit
judge observed: "The cautiousness of the council in approaching issues of
governance of the respective courts insures its tranquility and survival."
Ninth Circuit judges display more enthusiasm for the committees of the
council, despite the demands committee work places on their time. The
judges recently demonstrated their commitment to this form of participation
by rejecting a staff proposal to cut back sharply the number of circuit standing
committees. Apparently the committee system serves social and educational
functions which judges appreciate.
If the attitude toward circuit government among Ninth Circuit district and
appellate judges can be described as satisfaction bordering on complacency,
the viewpoint of non-article III judicial officers must be characterized in more
affirmative terms. The bankruptcy judges and magistrates I interviewed were
openly enthusiastic about Browning-era innovations. Judge Browning
recognized the significance of these constituencies in the circuit community to
a much greater extent than has Congress. 79' Judge Browning offered these
groups observer status on the circuit council and membership on council and
conference committees. He helped organize specialized conferences for
magistrates and bankruptcy judges, provided administrative support, and
attended their meetings.
The warmth of his welcome can be discerned in an incident during the
annual circuit conference, which Judge Warren Ferguson recalled at a
ceremony commemorating Judge Browning's service as chief judge. Judge
77. P. isii, sula note 6, at 429-30.
78. A recent survey conducted under the auspices of' the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council
substantiates this observation. 1)istrici judges were asked about their views of the court of appeals:
95% responded that circuit judges should show greater deference to the trial judge's evaluation of
the facts in an appeal: 80% agreed With the suggestion that a circtiii judge should sit as a trial judge
at least once a year: arod 44% noted a lack ofcollegialiiy between circuit and district judges. Office of'
the Circuit Exectitive. Ninth Citerit Judicial Cotuncil Surve . of' District Court Judges and Attorneys
Regarding the U.S. Coutt of'Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 18. 27 (July 1987).
79. Congress failed to provide for I till pait'icipation of the new bankruptcy judges in circuit
afFairs. See Bankrtptcy Refbi m Act of 1978. Pub. 1.. No. 95-598. 96 Stat. 2549 (effective Oct. 1,
1979).
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Ferguson was escorting a newly appointed bankruptcy judge to the
conference. Upon meeting the new judge, Judge Browning
knew that he had to devote at least five minutes of his entire attention to that judge
.... And he did. He did it seriously and truthfully, telling her how proud he was of
the bankruptcy courts in the Ninth Circuit. How proud he was of their achievements.
How proud he was that she was appointed through a very elaborate program that
picked the best. And he was most happy because women were achieving some of their
status in the judiciaryX(
This difference in perspectives between district judges and other judicial
officers suggests the importance of article III status in defining roles in the
circuit. With that status, an article III judge need not be particularly
concerned about how the circuit as a whole operates (though some are).
Without it, a judicial officer may have to depend on the organization of the
circuit and the leadership of its chief executive officer to overcome the
indifference or hostility of article III judges and find a satisfying and effective
role.
C. Ninth Circuit Government: An Assessment
Apart from judging, one of my informants observed, judges care only
about their space, their personnel, and their creature comforts. If circuit
government can help them with these needs, fine. If it purports to tell judges
how to judge, on the other hand, it will be universally resented. The judicial
and administrative leadership during the Browning era, it seems clear, set its
course with these concerns in mind. The leadership was reluctant to interfere
in the administrative decisions of judges, but was also unabashed in its
activism when the issue was more resources for the circuit.
The activities involved in lobbying for more resources and in
administering courts cannot, however, be easily separated. The Ninth Circuit
has developed a habit of self-study that serves not just to pinpoint needs, but
to create incentives for better practice. The court of appeals, for example,
recently commissioned a study to evaluate how its rule regarding unpublished
opinions is working.8 ' The council's Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas
Corpus likewise works from an impressive empirical base that includes
information about the number of inmates on death row and the point at which
their state remedies will be exhausted .8 2
The Browning legacy of studies and information-sharing also has
implications for the distribution of power within and beyond the circuit. The
information that can form the basis of persuasive arguments for change is
available to all members of the Ninth Circuit community, not just to the
80. Hon. Nanuel L. Real, Chief Judge. piesiding. U.S. District Cot ut, Central Dist. of Calif.,
Remarks of Judge Warren Ferguson during Special Session of Court in Tribute to Chief Judge
Eneritus James R. Browning (Dec. 8. 1988) (Reportr's trainscripi at 37).
81. The judges asked Professor Lauren K. Robel, Indiana L.aw School, to conduct the study.
Her results were published in Robel, The 1Myth !/ the DipIosable Opinion: I ,ptiblished Opinionis and
(;n'er mnent l~i/igant in the I'ited States Couts oJ ..Ippeals. 87 Micii. IL. Rcv. 940 (1989).
82. Matials fio the meeting of the Ninth Circuiit Judicial Council, Report of the Task Force on
)eath Penahv Habeas Corpus (Aug. 1988).
[Vol. 5 1: No. 4
Page 83: Autumn 1988]
leadership. Such information is a by-product of automation in any large
organization: "The same systems that make it possible to automate office
transactions," sociologist Shoshana Zuboff has observed, "also create a Vast
overview of an organization's operations, with many levels of data
coordinated and accessible for a variety of analytical efforts. '"8 :1 The capacity
the Ninth Circuit has developed to gather and disseminate information also
has a bearing on the contemporary debate over central versus regional
control of resources. The Ninth Circuit is in a better position than many
circuits to take over tasks that, up until now, have been within the ambit of the
Administrative Office.
The approach to governance judge Browning attempted to institutionalize
exacts a high price in the time and effort required of staff and participating
judicial officers. The numerous court, council, and conference committees
involve considerable staff work. For judicial officers, active involvement in
governance reduces time available for the day-to-day tasks associated with
managing court business, the tasks judges identify as their fundamental
professional obligation.
There will be pressure to increase the commitment of resources to
governance if decentralization of budgeting and associated administration
goes further, as seems likely. It is unclear at this writing, however, what role
current circuit-wide institutions will play in the process. It is difficult to
imagine thoroughgoing decentralization without a significant role for the
circuit council, the closest approximation the circuit has to a legislature. Yet if
there are hard resource-allocation and enforcement decisions to be made at
this level-and especially if those decisions infringe on traditional judicial
prerogatives in administration-it can be safely predicted that many judges
will resist circuit authority. The Ninth Circuit experience suggests that
representation for all constituencies, broad-based participation, and openness
in decisionmaking help make circuit-level guidance and information-sharing
palatable. But these same facts do not legitimize authoritative action, except
where misconduct is egregious. Even within the district courts, any exercise
of power by a chief district judge beyond what is strictly necessary for day-to-
day operations is unacceptable to some judges.
The issue for the future is whether judicial independence as traditionally
understood can survive pressure for more accountability within the judiciary.
The threat of a split forced the Ninth Circuit to face this issue earlier than its
counterparts. Judge Browning responded with changes designed to improve
communications within the circuit and to encourage judges to take
administrative concerns seriously. It is impossible to determine how much
these innovations in governance contributed to the circuit's iniproved
performance during the Browning period, but it is clear that the Ninth Circuit
is better organized than its counterparts to discuss its problems and to plan
for its future.
83. S. ZBHOF, IN Til" A(;F. OF T 1E SN .RT AIC\IIINE 9 (1988).
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CONCLUSION
The 1939 reformers who created circuit councils and conferences
envisioned circuit governance as a bulwark against excessive centralization-
and against excessive decentralization-in a national system ofjustice. Circuit
governance has not proven much of a bulwark against either the growth of the
Administrative Office or the individualism of judges, even in the Ninth
Circuit, where circuit institutions are strongest. Should circuit governance be
stronger? Or would the system be better if reform went in the other direction
and circuit-level adjudication and administration were decoupled? Each level
of the court system could manage its own affairs, with the districts organizing
into state-wide associations and hiring their own administrative personnel.
Eliminating the circuits as a significant element in the governance and
administration of the federal courts would ease certain tensions in the current
system. The logistics of gathering the administrative unit together under one
roof would be much simpler. The problem of mistrust between circuit and
district judges would be resolved, or at least deferred to national-level
institutions. Some administrative problems might be easier to attack in a
system where trial and appellate judges met separately and meetings were
limited to judicial officers within a single state.
Abolition of circuit-wide institutions would do little, however, to remedy
the deficiencies for which the federal courts are criticized most often: costly,
slow litigation; toleration of inefficient, irascible, and unfair judges; and
failure to confront current problems or plan for the future. When the circuit
councils were made up entirely of circuit judges, they demonstrated little
interest in these issues in their own courts. There is no reason to expect the
situation to be different in associations of district-level judicial officers.
The current system of regional governance also offers certain important
advantages. The large regional units are well positioned to make their views
heard in Washington-in Congress, the Administrative Office, and the
Judicial Conference. The interests of non-article III judicial officers are likely
to be better protected in a regional judicial system where these officers can
associate by specialty. The chief circuit judge and the circuit executive's office
are resources that these newly arrived professionals may be able to use in
defining a position for themselves in their districts. A mix of appellate- and
trial-level personnel in a circuit council and at annual gatherings may also
promote understanding between levels in the system and may promote better
decisions when the issue is misconduct and disability in the judicial ranks. In
sum, the heterogeneity of the circuit is an argument for its preservation as a
unit of governance.
The basic problem, crudely put, is that judges do not want to govern
themselves, but they do not want anyone else to do it, either. In this respect
judges resemble other professionals in contemporary American society.
Judicial reluctance to discipline colleagues and reluctance to assign that task
to others is a theme in debates over the role of managerial staff and in the
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controversy over whether budgeting should be centralized, regionalized, or
carried out at the district level. The inertial tendencies in such a system are
formidable. Many of the ideas implemented in the 1970's and 1980's, and
some still under discussion, were raised by articulate spokesmen in the 1930's,
1940's, and 1950's. The concepts of a circuit executive, decentralized
budgeting, and representation of all judges in circuit governance are
examples .84
The mechanisms through which judges communicate and deliberate are
relevant to the problem of improving court performance even though these
institutions are in no position to mandate wholesale change. The
Constitution vests Congress with the responsibility to make the law for the
federal courts, and our tendency has been to see any change in the litigation
process as a matter of constitutional moment. Efforts to keep down costs or
speed up adjudication, for example, are bound to be challenged as infringing
on due process guarantees and judicial independence. Yet while Congress is
the locus of final authority in federal court reform, individual judges typically
initiate the process and keep it in motion.
Reform initiatives can be encouraged or discouraged by the organization
of governance within the courts. It is helpful, for example, to have a forum to
discuss ideas in which the varied constituencies that make up the court system
are represented. The dissemination of ideas is easier if the governing system
within the courts is perceived as legitimate. Here lies the importance of the
Browning legacy. The system of circuit governance that the Ninth Circuit
created-however limited in its ability to coerce judges-provides a healthy
environment for considering the implications of administrative changes. And
the Ninth Circuit is good at making its voice heard in Washington.
Committed to the concept of decentralized authority and sensitized to the
fierce independence ofjudges, the Ninth Circuit is bound to star in the drama
in which the classic issues of judicial self-governance are debated and
transformed.
84. P. lFisii, slira hole 6, a( 155.
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